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PROTECTING PATENT OWNERS FROM
INFRINGEMENT BY THE STATES: WILL THE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
RESTORATION ACT OF 1999 FINALLY SATISFY
THE COURT?
I. INTRODUCTION
After years of hard work, you’ve finally done it. After eight years
of college and years spent working in the laboratory, your hard work has
finally paid off. Standing in the shower, washing away your sleepiness,
you finally experienced that wonderful “Eureka” feeling. You knew the
idea that popped into your head had never popped into the head of another. You just solved the problem you had been working on for years.
Your invention will work and it will work well. You see your patent attorney. Eighteen months later, you finally have a patent for your invention. That is when your dream begins to unravel.
Unfortunately, the only significant markets for your invention are
the state and federal governments. Maybe it was a method of testing automobile emissions. 1 Maybe it was a tidal flow system. 2 Whatever your
invention, it turns out that a state government is using it without your
permission and without paying you for its use. Outraged, you immediately see your patent attorney and file a lawsuit against the infringing
state. 3 Not long after your complaint is filed, your attorney calls you to
inform you that a federal district court judge has dismissed your case because the state has immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
Your attorney also informs you that you can not sue in state court be-

1. See Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
2. See Jacobs Wind Elec. Co., Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Transp., 919 F.2d 726 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
3. “Except as otherwise provided in [the Patent Act], whoever without authority makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United
States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 271 (1994) (emphasis added). “A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of
his patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1994) (emphasis added).
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cause the state courts can not hear patent infringement cases. 4 It appears
your hard work and creative efforts are for naught. The state can infringe your patent and there is nothing you can do about it.
Unfortunately, the situation described above reflects the state of the
law today. 5 Under the Eleventh Amendment, states 6 have long enjoyed
immunity from suits brought by private citizens in federal courts. 7 This
immunity, with only a few exceptions, 8 effectively renders Congress incapable of holding states to the same standards as it holds the federal
government and private actors. 9 As states begin to participate in the
public markets not as governing bodies, but as businesses seeking to
4. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under the Patent Act. 28
U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994). Patent owners cannot seek relief for patent infringement in state court.
Mavco, Inc. v. Hampden Sales Ass’n, 77 N.Y.S.2d 510, 515 (1st Dep’t. 1948). However, state remedies, if any, would still be available. But see Scott D. Nelson, Big Brother Stole My Patent: The
Expansion of the Doctrine of State Sovereign Immunity and the Dramatic Weakening of Federal
Patent Law, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 271, 307-309 (2000) (explaining why state courts are illequipped to decide on issues related to patent infringement).
5. See infra notes 33-163 and accompanying text.
6. The Eleventh Amendment applies only to states and arms or instrumentalities of the
states. U.S. Const. amend XI. Municipalities and counties are not “arms of the state.” N.M. Paterson & Sons, Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 176 F. Supp. 323, 324-25 (N.D. Ill. 1959). Universities are
arms of the state. Kersavage v. University of Tenn., 731 F. Supp. 1327, 1328 (E.D. Tenn. 1989).
The test as to what constitutes an arm of the state is somewhat unclear. Much of the analysis focuses on whether the entity in question has a direct fiscal impact on the state treasury. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 400-01 (1979). This direct-impact
test essentially asks whether the entity’s liability, when sued, will fall to the state. S.J. Groves &
Sons Co. v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 268 F. Supp. 568, 574 (D.N.J. 1967). Even where the action is not brought directly against the state, the Eleventh Amendment will apply whenever the state
is the real party in interest. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). See also Alex E. Rogers,
Note, Clothing State Governmental Entities with Sovereign Immunity: Disarray in the Eleventh
Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1243 (1992).
7. States have enjoyed this immunity at least since the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment and the Supreme Court’s liberal interpretation of it in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
See infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 130-152 and accompanying text.
9. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment “has put the federal judiciary in the unseemly position of exempting the States from compliance with laws that bind every
other legal actor in our Nation.” Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 248 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See Sulaiman M. Qazi, Comment, Licensed to Steal: Has Sovereign Immunity Gone Too Far?, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 779, 804 (1999) (stating the “states are held to a
different standard of liability than private patent holders”). Justice Frankfurter, in describing Eleventh Amendment immunity, referred to it as an “exceptional freedom from legal responsibility.”
Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939).
“Because states reap the benefits of patent laws, these laws should be applied equally to
states, companies, and individuals.” Kristen Healey, Comment, The Scope of Eleventh Amendment
Immunity from Suits Arising Under Patent Law After Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 47 AM. U. L. REV.
1735, 1772-73 (1998). But see College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 685 (1999) (“In the sovereign-immunity context . . . ‘[e]venhandedness’ between
individuals and States is not to be expected.”).
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make a profit, 10 the doctrine of state sovereign immunity becomes particularly troublesome. 11 Immunity for states acting in a proprietary capacity allows states to compete with private companies free of the restraints normally associated with patent law and other federal
regulations. 12
State sovereign immunity leaves patent owners in an unenviable
position: 13 holding the valuable right to exclude all others, 14 but unable
to enforce that right against state infringers.15 Worse yet, issues sounding in patent law and suits to recover damages for patent infringement
can be heard only before the federal courts,16 leaving no adequate remedy 17 available in the state courts. 18
10. States are increasingly acting in ways that are “functionally indistinguishable” from private actors in the market. Karl Manheim, New-Age Federalism and the Market Participant Doctrine, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 559, 570-71 (1990).
11. “Governmental growth has given rise to new entities which contain qualities of both state
actors and private business. As these entities multiply and change, the immunity question returns to
the forefront.” Jennifer A. Winking, Note, Eleventh Amendment: A Move Towards Simplicity In the
Test For Immunity, 60 MO. L. REV. 953, 954 (1995). See also Gordon L. Hamrick, IV, Comments,
Roving Federalism: Waiver Doctrine After College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board, 49 EMORY L.J. 859, 860 (2000) (stating that the College Savings Bank
decision “constructs a double standard for public and private participants in commercial enterprise,
thus ensuring that the [College Savings Bank] decision will have a critical effect on the mix of incentives affecting states as they expand their entry into the arena of business for profit”). Cf. Susan
Schoenfeld, Comment, The Applicability of Eleventh Amendment Immunity Under the Copyright
Acts of 1909 and 1976, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 163, 190 (1986) (“The manifest injustice of closing the
doors of the federal courts to individuals seeking recovery against a state is starkly presented when
an individual seeks damages for a state’s unlawful appropriation of copyrighted property.”).
12. Referring to a state’s immunity from patent infringement suits, the New Star Lasers court
stated that it “can conceive of no other context in which a litigant may lawfully enjoy all the benefits of a federal property or right, while rejecting its limitations.” New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1244 (E.D. Cal. 1999).
13. “Patentees now occupy a very precarious position relative to the states, and are left with
the prospects of no uniform, viable forum for addressing state violation of their property rights.”
Barry N. Young & Rachael A. Campbell, Florida Prepaid v. College Savings: United States Supreme Court Supports State Immunity From Suit Under Federal Patent Law, 16 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 499, 509 (2000).
14. “Every patent shall . . . grant to the patentee . . . the right to exclude others from making,
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 154
(1994).
15. “[A] State engaging in no more than ordinary business activities enjoys a substantial edge
over its competitors.” New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1240,
1243 (E.D. Cal. 1999). Congress’ inability to require states to be amenable to suit allows states to
infringe patents with impunity. Kenneth S. Weitzman, Comment, Copyright and Patent Clause of
the Constitution: Does Congress Have the Authority to Abrogate State Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity After Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.?, 2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 297, 330 (1991).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994); 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1994).
17. A denial of monetary damages “substantially refuses the patentee relief.” Lynn H.
Shecter, Constitutional Law-Sovereign Immunity-Right of a Patentee to Bring Suit in Federal Court
Against a State Agency for Patent Infringement, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1595, 1601 (1973).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2002

3

Akron Law Review, Vol. 35 [2002], Iss. 3, Art. 5
WHITE1.DOC

534

1/22/2021 3:45 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35: 3/4

Patent infringement by the states and their agencies, while not an
historically significant problem, 19 may very well become a significant
issue if the Patent and Trademark Office continues to see significant
growth in not only the number of patent applications it receives and issues each year, 20 but also a continued expansion of the fields in which
patents are issued. 21 An increase in the number of states acting in proprietary non-governmental roles 22 coupled with states taking increased
advantage of the federal intellectual property system 23 and the increase
in the rate of patent issuance may find patent owners holding a “right

18. See infra notes 153 and 157 and accompanying text.
19. But see Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, before the Subcommittee
on Courts and Intellectual Property Committee on the Judiciary on State Sovereign Immunity and
Protection of Intellectual Property (July 27, 2000) 2000 WL 1073148 (hereinafter, Peters Testimony) (stating that data compilation on the pervasiveness of federal intellectual property right violations by States and their agencies may be impossible to accurately determine subsequent to the 1985
decision in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon).
20. Comprehensive statistics of annual patent applications received and number of patents
issued by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) are available on the PTO’s website
(<http://www.uspto.gov >). These statistics indicate a sharp increase in the both the number of patent applications received and the number of patents issued. For example, in the years 1963, 1983,
1993 and 1999 the total number of patent applications received were: 90, 982; 112,040; 188,739;
288,811 respectively. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years
1963
–
1999
(visited
March
27,
2001)
<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf>. In those same years the number of
patents issued was: 48,971; 61,982; 109,747; 169,094. Id.
21. E.g., State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999), (method of doing business patents); In re Alappat,
33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (computer programs); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)
(living organisms). See also Michael North, Note, The U.S. Expansion of Patentable Subject Matter: Creating a Competitive Advantage for Foreign Multinational Companies?, 18 B.U. INT’L L.J.
111 (2000). There may be no practical limits as to what may be patented. See, e.g., Jeffrey A.
Smith, Comment, It’s Your Move – No It’s Not! The Application of Patent Law to Sports Moves, 70
U. COLO. L. REV. 1051 (1999) (discussing the patentablity of sports moves).
22. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Cf. Schoenfeld, supra note 11, at 191 (arguing
that states should only be amenable to suit when acting in a proprietary manner, not when acting in
a governmental capacity).
23. “States and their institutions, especially State universities, benefit hugely from the federal
intellectual property laws. All 50 States own or have obtained patents – some hold many hundreds
of patents . . . and the trend is toward increased participation by the States in commerce involving
intellectual property rights.” 145 CONG. REC. S13552-04, S13557 (1999) (statement of Sen.
Leahy). For example, in 1999, the University of California received more patents (436) than did
Microsoft (352), DuPont (338), AT&T (278), General Motors (275), Boeing (147), Compaq (251),
Merck (216) and Ford (151). U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Patenting By Organization 1999
(visited March 27, 2001) <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/topo_99.pdf>. “Both
the number and percent of total patents assigned to U.S. academic institutions have steadily increased since 1985. . . .” U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Technology Assessment and Forecast
Report, U.S. Colleges and Universities – Utility Patent Grants 1969-1999 (visited March 27, 2001)
<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/univ.pdf>.
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without a remedy.” 24
Congress has made attempts, in light of recent Supreme Court cases
affecting the state sovereign immunity doctrine, to protect the rights of
patent owners in the event of a state infringement. 25 However, the Court
has not been receptive to those efforts.26 The Intellectual Property
Rights Restoration Act of 1999 (IPRRA), 27 a Senate Bill currently making its way through Congress, seeks to provide a remedy for patent infringement by the states that Supreme Court will find constitutional. 28
In this Comment, Part II will explore the history of state sovereign
immunity under both the Eleventh Amendment and the common law. 29
Part III examines Senate Bill 1835, also known as the Intellectual Property Rights Restoration Act of 1999. 30 Part III looks at not only the substantive provisions of the IPRRA, but also at the legal arguments and
policy concerns that support the Act. Part IV looks at other possible solutions available to remedy the patent infringement-state sovereign immunity dilemma. 31 Part V concludes by stating that the Court should
uphold the IPRRA, if it is enacted, as a valid act of Congress which provides an effective and meaningful remedy to private patentees while advancing the policies behind both patent law and the doctrine of state
sovereign immunity.

24. Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184, 190 (1964). “[I]t is a
general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or
action at law whenever that right is invaded.” Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163
(1803) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
25. In 1992, Congress enacted the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification
Act which sought to make it unmistakably clear that the infringement remedies available in the Patent Act applied to the states. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, P.L.
102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (enacted). See also Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, P.L. 102542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1992) (enacted); Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, P.L. 101-553, 104 Stat.
2749 (1990) (enacted).
26. Some have deemed the courts recent efforts as “judicial activism under the rubric of protecting State sovereignty.” 146 CONG. REC. S7758-01, S7758 (July 27, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
27. Intellectual Property Rights Restoration Act of 1999, S.1835, 106th Cong [hereinafter
IPRRA].
28. The Court has held that numerous stringent criteria must be met before a state’s sovereign
immunity will be found waived, abrogated or otherwise set aside. See infra notes 33-152 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 33-163 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 164-231 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 232-241 and accompanying text.
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II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND STATE AMENABILITY TO SUIT
To properly understand the impact of sovereign immunity on patent
infringement litigation, it is necessary to understand the background of
the Eleventh Amendment and the recent developments in state sovereign
immunity jurisprudence. 32 Section A explores the basic principles of the
modern sovereign immunity doctrine. 33 Section B looks at exceptions to
the sovereign immunity doctrine. 34 Section C looks briefly at other protection for patent owners outside of the Patent Act. 35
A. Sources of Sovereign Immunity
1. Eleventh Amendment
In 1793, the Supreme Court decided Chisholm v. Georgia.36 The
decision allowed Chisholm, a South Carolina citizen to sue the State of
Georgia to recover monies the State owed him. It was not disputed that
the State was obligated to pay Chisholm certain monies. The real issue
before the Chisholm Court was whether the federal courts had jurisdiction to hear a case where a citizen of one state sued the government of
another state. 37 The Chisholm Court determined that the federal courts
did in fact have jurisdiction based upon the “letter of the Constitution”38

32. This Comment will try to present a brief review of the relevant case law and statutory responses as they pertain to patent law and the jurisdictional bar of sovereign immunity. I will barely
be able to scratch the surface of the simmering academic and legal debates surrounding the Eleventh
Amendment and the state sovereign immunity doctrine. For a more in-depth analysis of Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence, see James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An “Explanatory”
Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269 (1998); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and
State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033
(1983); Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 3, 18 (1963).
33. See infra notes 36-129 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 130-152 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 153-163 and accompanying text.
36. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2. Dall.) 419 (1793).
37. As the Court worded the issue it was “[c]an the State of Georgia, being one of the United
States of America, be made a party-defendant in any case, in the Supreme Court of the United
States, at the suit of a private citizen, even although he himself is, and his testator was, a citizen of
the State of South Carolina.”
Id. at 420.
38. Id.
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as set forth in section 2 of Article III of the Constitution. 39
The states quickly responded to Chisholm by ratifying the Eleventh
Amendment. 40 Effective in 1798, only five years after the Chisholm decision, the Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.” 41 By its express terms, the Eleventh Amendment only bars federal court jurisdiction when suits are brought against states by nonresident citizens and citizens of foreign lands. 42
The Eleventh Amendment was initially construed narrowly. In Cohens v. Virginia, 43 the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment only
prohibited unconsenting states from being sued in federal court where
the plaintiff was a resident of another state or a foreign country. 44
This narrow construction of Cohens would not last long. In Hans v.
Louisiana, 45 the Supreme Court held that the principle of sovereign immunity reflected in the Eleventh Amendment rendered states immune
from suits for monetary damages in federal court even where federal jurisdiction is premised on the presence of a federal question, despite this
scenario not being expressly included in the Eleventh Amendment. 46 In
Hans, a Louisiana citizen sued the State of Louisiana in federal court for

39. “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . . between a State and Citizens of another State . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
The Court held that it was “no degradation of sovereignty, in the States, to submit to the Supreme
Judiciary of the United States.” Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 425.
40. The Chisholm decision “created such a shock of surprise throughout the country that, at
the first meeting of congress thereafter, the eleventh amendment to the constitution was almost
unanimously proposed, and was in due course adopted by the legislatures of the states.” Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890). See also Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 62 (1989).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
42. See, e.g., Hans, 134 U.S. at 10.
43. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
44. Id. The literal text of the Eleventh Amendment only prohibits suits brought by “Citizens
of another State or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
45. Hans, 134 U.S. at 10.
46. Hans, 134 U.S. at 10. See also Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934); In re State of New York, 256 U.S. 490,
497-98 (1921); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311 (1920); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 447-49
(1900); Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899). Years later, the Parden Court would state that “a
suit on state debt obligations without the State’s consent was precisely the ‘evil’ against which both
the Eleventh Amendment and the expanded immunity doctrine of the Hans case were directed.”
Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184, 187 (1964). See also Jaffe,
supra note 32, at 19.
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payment on bonds that the State had repudiated. 47 As a basis for federal
jurisdiction, Hans, the Louisiana citizen, alleged the actions of the State
violated the Contracts Clause 48 of the United States Constitution. 49 The
Hans Court ruled in favor of the State on the basis of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, thereby preventing a citizen from suing his own state in federal court. 50 After the liberal 51 interpretation of
the Eleventh Amendment in Hans, states enjoyed absolute immunity
from all unconsented suits in federal court, whether brought by resident
or non-resident citizens. 52
Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama State Docks Department 53
was the first case 54 claiming Eleventh Amendment immunity where the
cause of action was brought under a federal statute. 55 The Parden Court
held that the State of Alabama, by operating a state-owned railway, had
constructively waived 56 its sovereign immunity in federal court and
could therefore be sued in a federal court under a federal statue for monetary damages. 57 The Court’s bipartite analysis asked whether (1) Congress intended to subject states to suit when it enacted the statute, and (2)
whether Congress had the power to subject the states to suit in light of

47. Hans, 134 U.S. at 1 .
48. “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
49. Hans, 134 U.S. at 3.
50. Id. at 18-21.
51. The Eleventh Amendment doctrine of sovereign immunity should be liberally construed.
Standing Rock Sioux Indian Tribe v. Dorgan, 505 F.2d 1135, 1138 (8th Cir. 1974). But see Parker
v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068, 1072 (D. Md. 1972) (stating that Eleventh Amendment should be
construed narrowly).
52. See Susan D. Raively, Note, Copyright Infringement Suits Against States: Is the Eleventh
Amendment a Valid Defense?, 6 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT. L.J. 501, 514 (1988).
53. Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
54. The Court noted that this case was distinctly unlike Hans where federal question jurisdiction was being invoked. Id. at 186. The Court stated that “[h]ere for the first time in this Court, a
State’s claim of immunity against suit by an individual meets a suit brought upon a cause of action
expressly created by Congress.” Id. at 187.
55. Petitioners in Parden where citizens of the State of Alabama who sued the State under the
Federal Employers’ Liability Act for personal injuries sustained while the petitioners where employed by the state-owned railway. Id. at 184-85. The statute permitted suit against “common carrier[s] by railroad . . . engaging in commerce between the several States.” Petitioners contended the
state-owned railway fell within the statutory definition and was therefore subject to suit in federal
court. The State appeared specially and moved to dismiss based on its sovereign immunity. Id. at
185. The District Court dismissed the suit, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, 311 F.2d 727. The Supreme Court reversed. Parden, 377 U.S. at 185.
56. Sovereign immunity may be waived. Id. at 186. A State’s freedom from nonconsensual
suit will not protect it from suit to which it has consented. Id. at 186. See infra notes 130-137 and
accompanying text.
57. Parden, 377 U.S. at 186.
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the state’s sovereign immunity. 58
The Court made short work of the first question by citing precedent 59 supporting the proposition that Congress meant the specific statute to apply to both private and state-owned railways. 60 The Court was
not willing to create a “right without a remedy” 61 by exempting stateowned railways from the plain meaning of the statute under the doctrine
of sovereign immunity as Congress could not have intended such a
“pointless and frustrating . . . result.” 62
With respect to the second element, the Court found the Commerce
Clause 63 vested sufficient authority in Congress to regulate railroads operating in interstate commerce. 64 By reasoning that, although the inherent nature of sovereignty has rooted within it immunity from suit, 65 the
states surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they granted to
Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. 66 To hold otherwise would have been an overtly paradoxical result, as it would allow a
state to avoid liability from federal regulation merely by engaging in the
regulated conduct. 67
However, the Parden Court made it clear that it did not intend to
overturn the Eleventh Amendment or the rule of Hans, 68 but rather stated it was the Court’s intention to find an implied or constructive waiver
in situations like that presented in Parden. 69 Constructive waiver was
found in Parden because Congress intended to make states amenable to
58. Id. at 187.
59. In particular, the Court cited United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), which held
the federal Safety Appliance Act applicable to state-owned railways, and California v. Taylor, 353
U.S. 553 (1957), which applied the Railway Labor Act to a state-owned railway. United States v.
California did not present Eleventh Amendment issues as the suit was brought not by an individual,
but by the United States. Parden, 377 U.S. at 188 n.6. California v. Taylor did not directly present
Eleventh Amendment issues, as it was a suit against a federal board. Id. at 188 n.7.
60. Parden, 377 U.S. at 187-88.
61. Id. at 190.
62. Id.
63. “The Congress shall have the Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
64. Parden, 377 U.S. at 190-192.
65. Id. at 190-91. See also Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 51 (1944); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton). Cf. Jaffe, supra note 32, at 3, 18 (tracing the history of
sovereign immunity through English and American history).
66. Parden, 377 U.S. at 191.
67. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946) (“[B]y engaging in the railroad
business a State cannot withdraw the railroad from the power of the federal government to regulate
commerce.”)
68. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
69. Parden, 377 U.S. at 192. The Court stated that “[i]t remains the law that a State may not
be sued by an individual without its consent.” Id.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2002

9

Akron Law Review, Vol. 35 [2002], Iss. 3, Art. 5
WHITE1.DOC

540

1/22/2021 3:45 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35: 3/4

suit by enacting the statute in question pursuant to a legitimate exercise
of its Commerce Clause powers 70 and by engaging in the regulated conduct some twenty years after the federal statute was enacted, no other
view can be held but that the State impliedly consented to suit. 71 The
rule of Parden set forth a constructive waiver exception to Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity. However, after more recent cases developed, the constructive waiver doctrine is no longer good law. 72 States
will no longer be deemed to have constructively waived their immunity
by their conduct.
Edelman v. Jordan 73 used the Eleventh Amendment to slam the
door on monetary judgments against states that will inevitably be paid
out of the state treasury. 74 Edelman recognized a private party’s right to
seek prospective relief under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 75 but declined to extend that doctrine to allow recovery of accrued, retroactive
payments. 76
Following the trend of prior cases which allowed state sovereign
immunity ample room to grow, Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon 77
significantly altered the constitutional landscape of Eleventh Amendment analysis by making it still more difficult for Congress to make
states amenable to suit in federal courts. In Atascadero, Scanlon, an applicant for a position as a graduate assistant with a state hospital, alleged
70. Id.
71. Id. The State, by venturing into the congressional realm “assume[d] the conditions that
Congress under the Constitution attached.” Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm’n, 359 U.S.
275, 281-82 (1959). “[W]hen a State leaves the sphere that is exclusively its own and enters into
activities subject to congressional regulation, it subjects itself to that regulation as fully as if it were
a private person or corporation.” Parden, 377 U.S. at 196. Cf. South Carolina v. United States,
199 U.S. 437, 463 (1905); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
72. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
683 (1999).
73. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
74. Id. at 663, 665. “[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be
paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Id. at 663.
75. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). For a discussion of the Ex parte Young doctrine
see infra notes 158-163 and accompanying text.
76. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 669. To demonstrate how far the Edelman doctrine would extend,
the Edelman Court impliedly affirmed its holding in Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
323 U.S. 459 (1945). See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668-69. In Ford Motor, a taxpayer who paid taxes
under protest sought a refund of those taxes from the state officials responsible for their collection.
Ford Motor, 459 U.S. at 459-461. The taxpayer alleged the taxes collected violated the U.S. Constitution. Id. The Ford Motor Court held the taxpayer’s action to be one against the State seeking a
monetary judgment and barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Despite the fact that the taxpayer was
merely seeking to recover only the monies he had paid to the state as a result of an unconstitutional
tax exaction and not any additional damages, the Court still refused to accept jurisdiction of the matter. Id.
77. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
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that the state hospital denied him employment because of his affliction
with diabetes mellitus in violation of a federal statute. 78 Scanlon sought
compensatory, injunctive, and declaratory relief under the federal statute. 79 The State of California moved to dismiss the action on the basis
of its Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court of appeals held that
Eleventh Amendment immunity did not bar the cause of action by finding an implied waiver based on participation in a federal program. 80 The
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision. 81
The Supreme Court began its analysis by recognizing the expansive
view of the Eleventh Amendment first set forth in Hans. 82 The Court
went on to acknowledge the waiver 83 and the Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement provision exceptions 84 to the Eleventh Amendment. 85
However, as the “Eleventh Amendment implicates the fundamental constitutional balance between the Federal Government and the States”
these exceptions are tempered by limiting their application to narrowly
tailored circumstances. 86 The Court was unable to find a waiver based
on a California Constitution provision, as the provision did not specifically state the State’s willingness to be subject to suit in federal court. 87
However, the waiver analysis was not what would make Atascadero an important case in modern Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. It was the holding that “Congress may abrogate the States’ constitutionally secured sovereign immunity from suit in federal court only
by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the stat78. Id. at 236. The federal statute in question was the Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Id.
79. Id.
80. Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 735 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1984).
81. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 234.
82. Id. at 237-38. The Court stated that the “significance of [the Eleventh] Amendment ‘lies
in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial
authority in Art. III’ of the Constitution.” Id. at 238 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984)).
83. See infra notes 130-137 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 138-146 and accompanying text.
85. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238.
86. Id. at 238-240. “[A] State will be deemed to have waived its immunity ‘only where stated
by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will] leave no
room for any other reasonable construction.’ Likewise, in determining whether Congress in exercising its Fourteenth Amendment powers has abrogated the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity,
we have required an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to overturn the constitutionally
guaranteed immunity of the several States.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
87. The California Constitutional provision provided that “[s]uits may be brought against the
State in such manner and in such courts as shall be direct by law.” CAL. CONST., art. III, § 5. As
the provision did not explicitly state that California waived its immunity and was willing to be subject to suit in federal courts, no waiver was found. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241.
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ute” that rendered Atascadero important. 88 Broad statutory language
will not be enough to find the requisite unmistakable intent to abrogate. 89 To abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity, Congress must specifically subject states to federal jurisdiction.90 Therefore, the federal statute in question in Atascadero, by providing that “any recipient of
Federal assistance” is liable for violations under the statute, did not evidence the requisite unmistakable intent to abrogate California’s sovereign immunity. 91
Prior to the Atascadero decision, owners of federal intellectual
property rights could fully protect their rights against infringement by
the states. 92 It appeared to be the rule post-Atascadero that Congress
could abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity provided that there was an
unmistakable intent to abrogate. However, Chew v. California93 and Ja88. Id. at 242.
89. Id. at 246.
90. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246. See also Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99.
91. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246.
92. Atascadero allowed states to avoid infringement and validity claims in federal courts.
Blaney Harper, Intellectual Property and State Sovereign Immunity: The Eleventh Amendment Under Scrutiny, 9 NO. 7 COMPUTER LAWYER 21, 26 (1992).
States had long enjoyed the benefits of the intellectual property laws on equal footing
with private parties. By the same token, and in accordance with the fundamental principles of equity on which our intellectual property laws are founded, the States bore the
burdens of the intellectual property laws, being liable for infringements just like private
parties. States were free to join intellectual property markets as participants, or to hold
back from commerce and limit themselves to a narrower governmental role. The intellectual property right of exclusion meant what it said and was enforced evenhandedly for
public and private entities alike. This harmonious state of affairs ended in 1985, [with
the Atascadero decision].
145 CONG. REC. S13552-04, S13556 (Oct. 29, 1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy). Peters Testimony,
supra note 19 (stating that from 1790 to 1962, no court decision exempted states from liability under the Copyright Act).
93. Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In Chew, Marian Chew, a resident of
Ohio, brought suit against the State of California for the State’s alleged infringement of Chew’s
patent for testing automobile exhaust emissions. Id. at 332. The federal District Court dismissed
the suit when the State claimed immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Id. Chew opposed the
State’s motion at the district court, arguing (1) that the state had waived its immunity under state
statues and the state constitution, (2) that the State impliedly consented by participation in the federal Clean Air Act, and (3) that Congress had abrogated the State’s immunity in various provisions of
the Patent Act and by giving the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over patent infringement suits.
Id. The District Court rejected all of Chew’s claims, the first two under Atascadero State Hospital
v. Scanlon. Id. Only the abrogation theory was advanced on appeal. Id. The Federal Circuit upheld the dismissal, finding that, assuming Congress had the power to subject states to suit for patent
infringement, “as a matter of statutory interpretation, that Congress has evidenced no intent to exercise such power in the patent statute” under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1982). Id. at 334. The Federal Circuit found that the word “whoever” in the § 271(a) was not unmistakably clear evidence of Congressional intent to abrogate. Id. The Court also rejected an argument advanced by Chew that the
public policy in awarding patents and the exclusiveness of federal jurisdiction in patent infringe-
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cobs Wind Electric Company v. Florida Department of Transportation, 94
both decided by the Federal Circuit in 1990, upheld the States’ sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for patent infringement suits
in federal court. 95
In response to the Jacobs Wind and Chew decisions, Congress
passed the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act
(PRCA) 96 in 1992. The PRCA made clear that Congress intended the
patent infringement provisions of the Patent Act to apply to the states. 97
Congress provided several justifications for the PRCA: (1) immunity
cuts against Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which
grants Congress the power to issue patents for limited period to promote
the progress of science; (2) the amendment prevents states from freely
infringing thereby discouraging future innovation; (3) enabling patentees
to sue states in federal court prevents states from enjoying advantages
not available to private parties; (4) the federal government already consents to patent infringement suits; and (5) the original patent code contains no expression of congressional intent to exclude states from the
reach of the statutes. 98 To justify the legislation, Congress cited as its
authority to pass the PRCA the Interstate Commerce Clause, the Patent
ment actions support a more liberal abrogation test. Id. at 335.
94. Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida Dept. of Transp., 919 F.2d 726 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Jacobs
Wind involved a Florida corporation suing the Florida Department of Transportation for patent infringement. Id. at 727. Florida Department of Transportation moved to dismiss claiming Eleventh
Amendment immunity and cited Chew as precedent. Id. However, Jacobs attempted to distinguish
Chew as Chew involved a diversity of citizenship suit, while no such diversity was present in Jacobs. The court found this distinction unimportant and affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of Jacobs’ suit. Id. at 728-29.
95. Chew, 893 F.2d at 331; Jacobs Wind, 919 F.2d at 726. See also Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alza
Corp., 804 F. Supp. 614, 625-26 (D.N.J. 1992); (finding no congressional abrogation of sovereign
immunity nor a waiver of immunity by the state); Kersavage v. University of Tenn., 731 F. Supp.
1327, 1330 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) (holding state university immune from suit under federal patent statutes). Cf. Lane v. First Nat’l Bank, 871 F.2d 166, 167-74 (1st Cir. 1989); Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114, 117-22 (4th Cir. 1988) (both Lane and Richard Anderson Photography held that language of Copyright Act did not unequivocally abrogate a state’s Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity as required by Atascadero).
96. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, P.L. 102-206, 104 Stat.
4230 (1992) (enacted).
97. By amending the 35 U.S.C. § 271 to include language reading “[a]s used in this section,
the term ‘whoever’ includes any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee
of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity” and by adding 35 U.S.C. § 296
which expressly state that sovereign immunity under any theory would not bar any infringement
action and that all remedies available in the Patent Act were available against States, Congress
clearly satisfied the Atascadero criteria for abrogating a state’s immunity. Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act, P.L. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (enacted).
98. S. REP. NO. 102-280 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3568 (hereinafter S. REP
NO. 102-280).
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and Copyright Clause, and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 99
However, in 1996, the Supreme Court’s Seminole Tribe decision
would render the PRCA invalid, at least under the Commerce Clause and
the Patent Clause. 100 In Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court held that
Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity under its Article I
powers. The abrogation analysis of sovereign immunity under Seminole
Tribe is (1) whether Congress has “unequivocally expressed its intent to
abrogate the immunity” and (2) whether Congress acted “pursuant to a
valid exercise of power.” 101
The Seminole Tribe analysis began rather easily. The language of
the statute in question, which was enacted after Atascadero, contained
unequivocal language expressing the intent to abrogate a State’s sovereign immunity. 102
The second part of the Seminole Tribe analysis sharply divided the
5-to-4 Court, and continues to do so to this day. 103 The majority began
by noting that the Court’s precedents have found the authority to abrogate under only two provisions of the Constitution. 104 The first of these
provisions is the Section 5 enforcement provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which extends authority for Congress to enact “appropriate
legislation” to enforce the prohibitions directed at the states in section 1
of that Amendment. 105 The second abrogating provision is Article I’s
Commerce Clause. 106 The Seminole Tribe Court reexamined the five99. S. REP NO. 102-280.
100. Seminole Tribe held that only the Fourteenth Amendment could be used to abrogate a
state’s sovereign immunity and that no Article I powers could abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55-60 (1996).
101. Id. at 55.
102. Id. at 56-57.
103. Hayden Gregory, Washington Legislative Report, 18 No. 3 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW NEWSLETTER 30, 30 (2000).
104. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59.
105. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976). Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment receives this exalted status capable of overriding the Eleventh
Amendment because it fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power by expanding
federal power at the expense of the states. Id. at 455.
106. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. held that the Commerce
Clause could abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1
(1989). Union Gas involved a lawsuit under federal environmental laws brought by the United
States against a former mine owner who then impleaded the State of Pennsylvania. The Union Gas
Court held that the federal statutes rendered the State subject to suit in federal court. In reaching
their decision, the Court stated that Supreme Court decisions “mark a trail unmistakably leading to
the conclusion that congress may permit suits against the States for money damages.” Id. at 14.
The Court stated that “the power to regulate commerce includes the power to override States’ immunity from suit, but [the Court] will not conclude that Congress has overridden this immunity unless it does so clearly.” Id. at 14-15. The power to regulate commerce would be “incomplete with-
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year old Union Gas decision which found abrogation possible under the
Commerce Clause and found that it “depart[ed] from [the] established
understanding of the Eleventh Amendment and undermine[d] the accepted function of Article III . . . [and] was wrongly decided.” 107 The
Court’s holding left Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as the only
clause capable of abrogating a state’s sovereign immunity. 108 Subsequent to Seminole Tribe, the status of the PRCA was questionable.
In 1999, the Supreme Court decide a pair of cases where a state’s
sovereign immunity and a patentee’s rights were in direct conflict. 109
Florida Prepaid 110 involved a patentee bringing suit against the State of
Florida for infringement of the patentee’s patent. 111 When suit was filed,
the PRCA had already been enacted. 112 However, after Seminole Tribe,
the PRCA was only a valid congressional act if made pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment. Following a Seminole Tribe analysis, 113 the
Court found the requisite intent to abrogate, but could not find the authority to abrogate under the Fourteenth Amendment. 114 To be a valid
abrogation under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress must identify
conduct transgressing the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment and must narrowly tailor the legislation to remedying and
preventing such transgressing conduct as City of Boerne v. Flores 115set
forth. 116 As Congress did not identify a pattern of patent infringement
by the states, the PRCA cannot be validly enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment 117
After the Florida Prepaid decision, the only remedy available to a
patent owner for an infringement of his patent by a state entity was proout the authority to render States liable in damages.” Id. at 20. Seminole Tribe overruled Union
Gas. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66.
107. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66.
108. Id. at 65.
109. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999).
110. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999).
111. In Florida Prepaid, College Savings Bank held a patent in a certain type of financing
methodology used to pay for college tuition. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 630-31. The State of
Florida created an entity which used College Savings Bank’s patented methodology to finance college educations. Id. at 631.
112. Id. at 631.
113. See supra notes 100-108 and accompanying text.
114. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635-41.
115. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
116. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639. See also City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507.
117. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640-43.
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spective relief under the doctrine of Ex parte Young 118 or pursuit of a
state remedy. To make matters worse, the Supreme Court, on the same
day as it handed down the Florida Prepaid decision, extended sovereign
immunity to states engaged in purely commercial activities.119
The current situation is bleak for patent and other intellectual property rights owners. 120 As it stands, patent owners “have but one arrow
left in their quiver to prevent or deter infringement of their intellectual
property rights by States,” 121 that being injunctive relief against particular employees of the state. While sovereign immunity has been drastically strengthened, injunctive relief under the doctrine of Ex parte
Young 122 remains intact. 123
2. The Inherent Nature of the States as Sovereigns
The Court’s decisions “make clear that much of [the] state immunity doctrine has absolutely nothing to do with the limit on judicial power
contained in the Eleventh Amendment.” 124 According to many scholars,
the presence of the Eleventh Amendment in the United States Constitution may be redundant; states may have had sovereign immunity all
along 125 and may continue to have immunity greater than that set forth in
the Eleventh Amendment. 126 The Constitution, the founding document
118. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
119. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999).
120. After Florida Prepaid, “[p]atentees now occupy a very precarious position relative to the
states, and are left with the prospects of no uniform, viable forum for addressing state violation of
their property rights.” Young, supra note 13, at 509.
121. See Peters Testimony, supra note 19.
122. See infra notes 158-163 and accompanying text.
123. However, some feel, given the Court’s movement in recent years, that the doctrine of Ex
parte Young may be subject to question. See Peters Testimony, supra note 19.
124. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 25 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring).
125. See 17 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 123.02 (3d. Release
126, 2000) (stating that before the formation of the United States, each state was a sovereign entity
and enjoyed the benefit of the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity).
126. “[T]he sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from nor is limited by the terms
of the Eleventh Amendment.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999). “[T]he Constitution’s
structure, and its history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear [that] the
States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today . . . .” Id. “[I]t is inherent in
the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without [the state’s] consent.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 81. “Eleventh Amendment discourse is less concerned with analyzing
the plain meaning of the Amendment’s text as it is with locating backdrop sovereign immunity concepts believed by the Court to be central to the federalism rubric.” Hamrick, supra note 11, at 864.
But see Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity “Exception,” 110 HARV. L. REV. 102, 123
(1996) (questioning why, in a democratic republic the presumption is not against sovereign immuni-
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of the United States, “recognizes the States as sovereign entities.” 127
Under the inherent power view of state sovereign immunity, the Eleventh Amendment was an explanatory amendment 128 designed to remedy
the Chisholm decision, not to create sovereign immunity in the first instance. 129
B. Exceptions to Sovereign Immunity
1. Waiver
Waiver constitutes a well-known exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity sufficient to subject a state to suit in federal court. 130
However, as with all waivers of constitutional rights, a waiver of sovereign immunity will not be lightly inferred.131 States may waive their
immunity by making a general appearance in litigation before a federal

ty as accountability to the people, both at the polls and to wronged individuals in the courts, should
be the inherent nature of sovereignty); John Randolph Prince, Forgetting the Lyrics and Changing
the Tune: The Eleventh Amendment and Textual Infidelity, 104 DICK. L. REV. 1 (1999) (arguing for
an interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment that follows the clear textual language of the Amendment).
127. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.15 (1996). Cf. Blatchforce v. Native Village
of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (“[T]he States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact.”). But see Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 259 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“There simply is no constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity, and no constitutionally mandated policy of excluding suits against States from federal court.”).
128. See Pfander, supra note 32, at 1269.
129. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (the Eleventh Amendment stands
not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition which it confirms). But see Atascadero, 473
U.S. at 259 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The flawed underpinning [of the Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence] is the premise that either the Constitution or the Eleventh Amendment embodied a principle of state sovereign immunity as a limit on the federal judicial power.”) Justice Brennan also cites new evidence showing that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to
constitutionalize the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. Id.
130. “[T]he [Supreme] Court consistently has held that a State may consent to suit against it in
federal court.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99. See also Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414 (1979); Petty
v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission, 359 U.S. 275, 276 (1959); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S.
18, 24 (1933); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883); Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529
(1857). For a more in-depth analysis of the waiver doctrine, see Hamrick, supra note 11.
131. “Constructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of constitutional rights. . . .” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974). The Court will find a waiver
“only where stated ‘by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the
text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’” Id. at 673 (quoting Murray v.
Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)). See also Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241 (stating that
the test for finding a waiver of immunity is a “stringent one”). “[C]ourts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver” of constitutional rights. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy ex rel. Bogash, 301
U.S. 389, 393 (1937).
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court, 132 by statute 133 or by state constitution. 134 A waiver of immunity
before a state’s own courts will be insufficient to constitute a waiver of
immunity before federal courts. 135 A state will be deemed to have
waived immunity “only where stated ‘by the most express language or
by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will] leave no room
for any other reasonable construction.’” 136 Courts will no longer find a
state to have constructively waived its sovereign immunity by its conduct. 137
2. Congressional Abrogation
a. Pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
As a patent constitutes property, a suit for patent infringement implicates interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.138 Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 139among others, stated that the Eleventh Amendment, and the
132. Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1883).
133. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 468-70 (1945). When waiver
of Eleventh Amendment sovereignty is by state statute, the question the courts must answer is
whether the state intended to waive its sovereign immunity. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge
Commission, 359 U.S. 275, 278-79 (1959). Compacts between states may also provide a basis to
find a waiver of sovereign immunity. Id.
134. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241. “[I]n order for a state statute or constitutional provision to
constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, it must specify the State’s intention to subject itself to suit in federal court.” Id.
135. Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590, 591-92 (1904). Mere receipt of federal funds will also be
inadequate to establish that a state has consented to suit. Florida Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative
Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass’n., 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981).
136. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co.,
213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)).
137. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
681-82 (1999).
138. New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp.2d 1240, 1243 (E.D.
Cal. 1999).
139. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). Fitzpatrick involved former Connecticut State
employees suing several state officials in their official capacities for gender discrimination in the
administration of retirement benefit plans. Justice Rehnquist’s opinion stated that Title VII was
appropriate legislation under the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment and any
claim of sovereign immunity was thereby ineffective. Justice Brennan noted that the Eleventh
Amendment was inapplicable here as the suit involved citizens of a State suing their own state and
therefore it fell outside of the bounds of the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 457 (Brennan J., concurring in judgment). Brennan noted that any claim of sovereign immunity in the present case must
fall under the “nonconstitutional but ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity.” Id. Brennan concurred with the majority because he felt that by surrendering certain powers to the federal government under the commerce clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, no immunity in fact
exists for the State to assert. Id. at 458. Justice Stevens, in a separate concurring opinion, felt that
the case should be decided not on Section 5 grounds, but based on the proposition that the Eleventh
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principle of sovereign immunity which it embodies, is necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 140 The Court felt that “Congress may in determining what
is ‘appropriate legislation’ for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or
state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.” 141 Abrogation under Section 5 was recently upheld in Seminole
Tribe. 142 Florida Prepaid 143 set forth three criteria for abrogation under
the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) Congress must establish a strong record
of infringement by the States, 144 (2) the abrogation must be drafted in
such a way as to apply only to those states that do not provide a state
remedy, i.e., it must be narrowly tailored 145 and (3) the abrogation must
extend only to non-negligent infringement by the states. 146
b. Pursuant to the Commerce Clause
Union Gas 147 held that Congress could abrogate a state’s sovereign
immunity by acting pursuant to the Commerce Clause. It is now the law
that Congress does not have abrogation power under the Commerce
Clause or any other Article I power 148 even when the Constitution grants
Congress complete lawmaking authority over that area of law, 149 leaving
the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment as the only valid Congressional power capable of abrogating a state’s sovereign immunity.
3. Other Exceptions
The Eleventh Amendment does not preclude states from suing other
states, 150 and the federal government is not precluded from bringing ac-

Amendment does not bar an action against state officers enforcing an invalid statute. Id. at 459
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
140. Id. at 456.
141. Id.
142. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1996).
143. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999).
144. Id. at 638-39.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 645-46.
147. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
148. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
149. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
150. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999).
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tions against the states. 151 Nor will the Eleventh Amendment prevent
federal courts from hearing appeals of federal questions properly commenced before state courts when the state is a defendant.152
C. Other Patentee Protections
1. State Law and the State Court System
While federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over matters of patent infringement, 153 most states have some other types of protections for
intellectual property rights independent of the Patent Act.154 Unfortunately, these state law remedies fail to provide any remedy for an infringed patent. 155 However, a private patentee may be able to assert a
takings claim in state court.156 Of course, it remains a federal legislative
option to amend the current Patent Act to allow patent infringement cases in state courts. 157
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18,
26-27 (1990).
153. “[T]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any
Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety, and copyright cases.” 28
U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994). However, state courts can decide patent issues that are properly before it.
See, e.g., Intermedics Infusaid v. University of Minn., 804 F.2d 129 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Oximetric, Inc., 748 F.2d 637 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Becher v. Contoure Labs. Inc., 279 U.S. 388 (1929).
154. For more on state unfair competition laws and patent enforcement, see Peter J. Wied, Patently Unfair: State Unfair Competition Laws and Patent Enforcement, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469
(1999) and Bruce P. Keller, Condemned to Repeat the Past: The Reemergence of Misappropriation
and Other Common Law Theories of Protection for Intellectual Property, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
401 (1998).
155. “As federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under . . . federal laws,
the majority’s conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment shields States from being sued under them
in federal court suggests that persons harmed by state violations of federal copyright, bankruptcy,
and antitrust laws have no remedy.” Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 77 n.1 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156. Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida Dept. of Transp., 919 F.2d 726, 728-29 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
157. According to the Supreme Court’s Alden decision, immunity in state court is equivalent to
immunity in federal court. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). Therefore, this remedy would
only be effective to the extent States would willingly waive their immunity before the State courts
for actions under the federal patent Act. Peters Testimony, supra note 19. It would appear unlikely,
particularly in light of the strength of the State’s sovereign immunity before the federal courts, that
States would expose themselves to additional liability before the State courts. Id. However, state
court patent jurisdiction creates new problems. The need for uniform patent law led to the creation
of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Id. Allowing patent claims to be heard before state
courts would greatly increase the number of interpretations of patent law, thereby defeating the purpose of the federal Circuit. See id. (discussing similar problems should Congress allow copyright
claims under Title 28 to be heard in state court). Furthermore, state court judges have no experience
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2. Injunctive Relief
As a general rule, the jurisdiction bar of the Eleventh Amendment
prohibits suits against unconsenting states regardless whether the relief
sought is legal or equitable in nature. 158 However, under the doctrine of
Ex parte Young, 159 the Court created a narrow exception to the general
rule. Under Ex parte Young, federal courts may enjoin state officials
from committing continuing or future violations of federal law, 160 but
the courts may not award retroactive or monetary damages. 161 Ex parte
Young essentially states that when a state official acts in violation of federal law, that employee is, by definition, acting outside of the scope of
his official duties, as a state cannot authorize one of its employees to
violate federal law. 162 Therefore, a state employee is not immune and
may be enjoined. 163 However, Ex parte Young relief is limited, as it
does not allow for the recovery of damages for past infringement.
III. THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS RESTORATION ACT OF 1999
After the apparently failed Congressional attempts to provide a
remedy to patent owners for patent infringement by the states, on November 1, 1999, Senator Leahy introduced a bill known as the Intellectual Property Rights Restoration Act of 1999 (IPRRA). 164
The basic premise of the IPRRA is quite simple: any state wishing
to own federal intellectual property, including patents, 165 must expressly
with the issues surrounding patent law. See id. (stating similar experience problems under the Copyright Act). See also Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobile Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 483-84 (1981) (stating
the policies behind exclusive federal jurisdiction).
158. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-01 (1984).
159. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The theory of Ex parte Young is that an unconstitional act is void and therefore does not “impart to [the state officer] any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.” Id. at 160. As a state does not have the authority to authorize unconstitutional acts, state officers are “stripped of [their] official or
representative character and [are] subject[ ] to the consequences of [their] official conduct.” Id.
160. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See also Waste Mgmt. of Penn., Inc. v. Shinn, 938
F. Supp. 1243 (D.N.J. 1996). But see Fiedler v. New York, 925 F. Supp. 136 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
161. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666-67 (1974).
162. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See also Lemelson v. Ampex Corp., 372 F. Supp.
708, 711 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (“Government units have no authority to violate the patent laws, and when
they do so, they act outside the scope of their authority.”).
163. Many consider the doctrine of Ex parte Young to be a “legal fiction” and a “massive,
judge-made exception” to the Eleventh Amendment. E.g., Monaghan, supra note 126, at 127; Ann
Althouse, When to Believe a Legal Fiction: Federal Interests and the Eleventh Amendment, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 1123, 1123 (1989). Others, however, consider the Eleventh Amendment an exception to Ex parte Young. See Monaghan, supra note 126, at 126, n.173.
164. IPRRA.
165. The IPRRA applies to patents, protected plant varieties, copyrights, mask works, original
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waive its sovereign immunity and consent to suit as a condition of being
eligible to receive additional federal intellectual property. 166 The IPRRA
requires that, in a state’s application for federal intellectual property, the
state provide an assurance that it will waive its Eleventh Amendment
immunity in any subsequent actions arising under federal intellectual
property law. 167 To ensure that a state does not retract its assurance after
being granted intellectual property rights, the IPRRA provides consequences to states that acquire federal intellectual property rights by
providing an assurance of waiver and breach that assurance by claiming
sovereign immunity when the state is sued. 168 By forcing the state to
take action, the IPRRA avoids the pitfalls previously encountered in attempts to hold states liable for patent infringement. 169 The IPRRA solution is “clear and salable, with a compelling proportionality and nexus
between the problem and the remedy” 170 and should be enacted and upheld.
The theory of the IPRRA has met with some judicial approval, at
least in dicta, in prior cases. 171 The law as it currently exists seems to
designs, trademarks, and service marks. IPRRA § 101(1).
166. Section 111(a) prohibits any state from acquiring federal intellectual property without
opting into the federal intellectual property system as defined in Section 101(3). IPRRA § 111(a).
The federal intellectual property system encompasses the protection and enforcement of federal intellectual property laws, including through the award of damages, injunctions and declaratory relief.
IPRRA § 101(3). Section 111(b) provides that in order for a state to opt into the federal intellectual
property system as required under § 111(a), the state provide an assurance under procedures established in § 131-137 that the state will waive its sovereign immunity in any action brought under federal intellectual property laws. IPRRA § 111(b).
167. IPRRA § 111(b).
168. If a state asserts sovereign immunity for an action under federal intellectual property laws,
it will be deemed to have breached its assurance if the assertion of immunity is not withdrawn within sixty days. IPRRA § 112. To deter such breaches, § 113(a) states that intellectual property applications which contain an assurance of waiver and that are pending on the date of the breach are
deemed abandoned and not subject to revival. IPRRA § 113(a). Also, a state may not collect damages or other monetary relief under the federal intellectual property right that is or has been owned
by the state within five years of the date of the breach. IPRRA § 113(b). Further, states will be
barred from opting back into the federal intellectual property system for one year from the date of
the breach. IPRRA § 113(c).
169. See supra notes 36-129 and accompanying text.
170. See Peters Testimony, supra note 19. “Equity and common sense tell us that one who
chooses to enjoy the benefits of a law-whether it be a federal grant or the multimillion-dollar benefits of intellectual property protections-should also bear its burdens.” 145 CONG. REC. S13552-04,
S13557 (1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
171. I agree that it is within the power of Congress to condition a State’s permit to engage in
the interstate transportation business on a waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity from suits arising out of such business. Congress might well determine that allowing regulable conduct such as the
operation of a railroad to be undertaken by a body legally immune from liability directly resulting
from these operations is so inimical to the purposes of its regulation that the State must be put to the
option of either foregoing participation in the conduct or consenting to legal responsibility for injury
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support the IPRRA approach. Even with the law on its side, the IPRRA
might still need more to be found constitutional.
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity has reached far beyond
its textual boundaries to preclude virtually all suits against unconsenting
states. While the inherent sovereignty of the states is often credited for
this expansive view of the Eleventh Amendment, modern Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence can simply be boiled down to policy concerns
trumping the law. To pass constitutional muster, the IPRRA needs support of not only the law, but needs to preserve the policies behind the
modern interpretation of the state sovereign immunity doctrine. As explained below, the IPRRA will in fact satisfy the law and preserve the
policies of the Eleventh Amendment.
A. IPRRA Is Not An Abrogation of a State’s Sovereign Immunity
The stringent requirements 172 for congressional abrogation of a
state’s sovereign immunity is simply no longer an issue under the
IPRRA. 173 Under the IPRRA, the elimination of the state sovereign immunity bar occurs not through Congressional abrogation, but rather
though a voluntary and knowing waiver by the state.
B. IPRRA Provides a Valid Method to Induce Waiver by the States
As waiver represents a valid exception to the state sovereign immunity doctrine, 174 states can not complain that the IPRRA violates their
defense of immunity before the federal courts. The waiver of a state’s
sovereign immunity constitutes a waiver of a constitutional right. 175 As
such, this waiver of immunity must meet a higher standard than waivers
of other rights. Particularly, the waiver must be both knowing and voluntary.
The only challenge that might arise regarding the waiver theory uncaused thereby.
Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
172. See supra notes 138-146 and accompanying text.
173. “Abrogate” means “[t]o annul, cancel, revoke, repeal, or destroy.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 4 (abridged 6th ed. 1991). The IPRRA leaves the state’s sovereign immunity intact.
No state is precluded from raising an immunity defense at any time, even after opting into the
IPRRA. The fact that Congress may choose to condition the receipt of federal intellectual property
by states upon the state assuring that it will waive its immunity at some future point doe not “annul,
cancel, revoke, repeal, or destroy” the sovereign immunity of any state.
174. See supra notes 130-137 and accompanying text.
175. But see Hamrick, supra note 11, at 874-75 (arguing waiver of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity is a waiver of a jurisdiction right, not necessarily a constitutional right, and therefore the higher standard does not apply).
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der the IPRRA is the issue of coercion. States could argue that, while
they knowingly 176 waived their immunity, it was coerced and therefore
involuntary. However, the coercion argument is ineffective with respect
to the Patent Act. 177 Congress is free to condition the grant of a patent
on certain conditions as it sees fit, so long as the legislation promotes the
advancement of science and techonology.
C. Congress Can Enact IPRRA Under Congress’ Article I, Section 8,
Clause 3 Powers
It is well established that Congress has plenary power under the Patent and Copyright Clause. 178 The only limitation placed upon Congress
when acting under the authority of the Patent and Copyright Clause is
that the legislation must “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.” 179 Given Congress’ plenary power, Congress is free to condition
the issuance of a patent on the compliance with specific requirements, 180
176. There will be no issue of whether the waiver of immunity was knowingly made. The
IPRRA procedures for providing an assurance of waiver eliminates this argument’s viability.
177. As Congress had plenary power to enact patent statutes and is able to condition the issuance of a patent, a state cannot be coerced by Congress withholding issuance of a patent to a state
unless a state meets certain criteria. Cf. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (allowing Congress to condition receipt of federal funds upon state meeting certain conditions so long as the condition is in the pursuit of the public welfare and is done in an unambiguous manner).
College Savings Bank discusses that forced waiver based on a state’s conduct is not sufficient to abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 684-85. (1999). The IPRRA is readily distinguishable from the
issue in College Savings Bank. The IPRRA does not limit a state’s conduct and does not explicitly
punish it for its conduct. States are free to infringe patents and have the Eleventh Amendment defense available, however, if states wish to receive rights in additional intellectual property, they
must opt-in and waive their immunity. As Congress is not required to issue patents to parties who
fail to comply with the Patent Act’s statutory provisions, Congress can choose to not allow states to
receive patents absent their opting-in. By not forcing the state to limit its activities, the IPRRA
avoids the problems discussed in College Savings Bank.
178. Boyden v. Commissioner of Patents, 441 F.2d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Cf. Thomas M.
Clark, Note, More Plenary Than Thou: A Post-Welch Compromise Theory of Congressional Power
to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1022 (1988) (arguing that Congress retained abrogation authority under the inherently limited powers of Article I, such as those powers
under the Patent and Copyright Clause).
179. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
180. “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of [the Patent Act].” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966); Owen v. Paramount Productions, 41 F. Supp. 557
(S.D. Cal 1941); Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
Congress has already provided several strict conditions in the Patent Act. Section 101 limits patentable subject matter. 35 U.S.C. §101 (1994). Section 102 requires that patented inventions be novel.
35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). Obvious inventions are barred from being patented under Section 103. 35
U.S.C. § 103 (1994).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol35/iss3/5

24

White: Protecting Patent Owners from Infringement by the States
WHITE1.DOC

2002]

1/22/2021 3:45 PM

PROTECTING PATENT OWNERS FROM INFRINGEMENT BY THE STATES

555

including a requirement that the party receiving the federal intellectual
property be amenable to suit.
Additionally, patents are not issued as of right. 181 No one has a
constitutional right to receive a patent. Furthermore, the Patent and
Copyright clause is permissive; it does not command Congress to grant
patents, but merely permits it. 182 Congress has authority under the Patent and Copyright Clause to prescribe to whom and on what terms and
conditions a patent will issue. 183
D. IPRRA Does Promote the “Progress of Science and the useful Arts”
The opt-in procedure of the IPRRA does “promote the Progress of
Science and the useful Arts.” 184 States constitute one of the largest potential markets many inventors will have for their inventions, and in
some cases, the only potential market. 185 To allow a state to infringe a
patent without a remedy for the inventor removes a large portion of the
inventor’s potential market, 186 and would significantly chill the inventor’s incentive to create. By providing a real monetary remedy against
infringing states, inventor’s creative energies will not be dampened and
society as a whole will continue to benefit from the creation of new and
improved technologies. 187
181. “A patent constitutes a ‘gift or gratuity’ bestowed by the federal government, and if Congress has conditioned its receipt on a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity to a declaratory
suit, then Congress has acted permissibly.” New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63
F. Supp.2d 1240, 1244 (E.D. Cal. 1999).
182. Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1124 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
183. Owen v. Heimann, 12 F.2d 173, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Rubbermaid Inc. v. Contico Int’l,
Inc., 381 F. Supp. 666, 668 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
184. See K Kalan, Property Rights, Individual Rights, and the Viability of Patent Law Systems,
71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1439, 1453 (2000) (“[P]rotection of intellectual property rights leads to innovation and technological advancement.”).
185. For example, if an inventor were to invent a device that would allow police to safely stop
a fleeing automobile during a high-speed pursuit, much of the demand for such a device would likely come from state police agencies that would be protected by the Eleventh Amendment.
186. See Peter S. Menell, Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity From Infringement of Federal Intellectual Property Rights, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1399, 1399 (2000) (charactering
the “fifty states and their myriad agencies and institutions” as a “significant class of consumers of
intellectual property”).
187. “[E]nhancing the scope or enforceability of intellectual property rights increases the expected reward to those engaged in intellectual work, thereby spurring intellectual creativity and the
exploitation of works. Inversely, impediments to the enforcement of the intellectual property rights
or limitations on remedies reduce this reward stream and opportunity for exploitation, thereby
dampening the incentives of those who engage in creative enterprise.” Menell, supra note 186, at
1399. See also Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law,
1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2189 (2000) (stating the growth of intellectually property law is
“closely intertwined with new technologies”).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2002

25

Akron Law Review, Vol. 35 [2002], Iss. 3, Art. 5
WHITE1.DOC

556

1/22/2021 3:45 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35: 3/4

Congress has plenary authority as to all matters affecting the issuance of patents 188 and may set forth conditions that must be satisfied before a patent will issue. 189 The Constitution does not mandate that patents issue, 190 rather, it merely gives Congress the authority to issue
patents on such terms as Congress sees fit 191 subject only to the limitation that the issued patent promote science and technology. 192 Further,
the states could not complain about “special” requirements being placed
on them, 193 as the Patent and Copyright Clause does not have the requirement of uniformity that other clauses of Article I, Section 8 have. 194

188. Grob v. Continental Machine Specialties, Inc., 283 N.W. 774, 774 (Minn. 1939); Boyden
v. Commissioner of Patents, 441 F.2d 1041, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
189. “Within the scope established by the Constitution, Congress may set out conditions and
tests for patentability.” Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). See also Rubbermaid,
Inc. v. Contico Int’l, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 666, 668 (E.D. Mo. 1974); McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S.
202 (1843). At present, utility, novelty and nonobviousness are the three requirements for a patent
to issue. Congress would seemingly be free to add a fourth criteria, such as, amenability to suit or
waiver of immunity. “Incident to [the Patent Clause powers], Congress may attach conditions on
the receipt of exclusive intellectual property rights. Indeed, [Congress has] always attached certain
conditions . . . in order to obtain a patent.” 145 CONG. REC. S13552-04, S13557 (1999) (statement
of Sen. Leahy).
190. The Patent Clause of the Constitution “empowers but does not command the Congress to
grant patent rights.” Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1124 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). See
also Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 525-26 (1972). “[T]here is no inherent
entitlement to federal intellectual property rights.” 145 Cong. Rec. S13552-04, S13557 (1999)
(statement of Sen. Leahy). Patent rights exist solely by virtue of statute. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
191. “The right to a patent is purely statutory and Congress has full power to prescribe to
whom and upon what conditions a patent shall issue.” Owen v. Heimann, 12 F.2d 173, 174 (D.C.
Cir. 1926). “No person has a vested right to a patent . . . but is privileged to seek the protected monopoly only upon compliance with the conditions which Congress has imposed.” Boyden v. Commissioner of Patents, 441 F.2d 1041, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
192. “Congress having created the [patent] monopoly, may put such limitations upon it as it
pleases.” Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 494 (1900). See Healey, supra note
9, at 1771 (stating that Congress “must” be able to enforce patent laws against the state to achieve
the purpose of the Patent Act).
193. “The right to a patent is purely statutory and Congress has full power to prescribe to
whom and upon what terms and conditions a patent shall issue.” Owen v. Heimann, 12 F.2d 173,
176 (D.C. Cir. 1926).
If Congress is to have any power with respect to patents, it must have the power to preserve the rights accompanying the patent. The essence of a patent is the right to exclude others.
United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913).
In his Atascadero dissent, Justice Brennan noted that the goal of the current Eleventh
Amendment doctrine seems to be to obstruct Congress’ ability to exercise its powers in an otherwise
unexceptional manner and a manner well within the reach of its Article I powers. Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 255 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
194. Radio Position Finding Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 205 F. Supp. 850, 857 (D. Md. 1962).
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E. Courts Should Defer to Congressional Policy Absent Constitutional
Violation
Furthermore, in interpreting the IPRRA, courts should give deference to the legislative policy Congress has chosen. Traditionally, American courts have passed on the opportunity to decide on the wisdom and
utility of legislation and have deferred to the choices of the legislature. 195
F. IPRRA Is In the Public Interest
Deciding how strong to make patent rights requires a delicate balancing. 196 This delicate balancing, however, favors granting patentees a
right to pursue an infringement action against state entities and to recover monetary damages. 197 Patents and their accompanying rights are the
life-blood of a strong economy 198 and are essential for inventors to be
competitive in the marketplace. 199 The value of patents in the modern
195. “Under the system of government created by [the U.S.] Constitution, it is up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation.” Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726, 729 (1963). “[C]ourts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of
legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.” Id. at 730.
196.
If the level of intellectual property protection is too low, negative effects follow. Prospective authors turn to other careers. Drug companies decrease investment in research
and development. Yet every intellectual property right granted diminishes the public
domain of freely available material. If intellectual property rights are set too high, future
creators will be deprived of the raw materials they use to create new works. For example,
could Bill Gates have created MS-DOS if BASIC and CP/M had been proprietary systems protected by an expansive intellectual property regime? We must remember that the
system is not a linear function with each additional property right producing a corresponding increase in future production. It is just as dangerous to produce a system with
too much intellectual property protection as one with too little. Each proposed expansion
(and even the current state) of intellectual property rights should be approached with the
same skepticism as any other state-backed monopoly. We should ask whether the monopoly has been shown to be necessary. We should worry about all of the effects of enforcement of the monopoly, not just the diminishing public domain but also possible side
effects on free speech, competition in information products, and privacy. We should see
whether there are other available ways for creators to receive a return adequate to promote future investment.
James Boyle, Intellectual Property Policy Online: A Young Person’s Guide, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
47, 49 (1996).
197. The current state of the law, where a private patentee is forced to seek a state waiver or
attempt to find a viable state law theory to pursue, does not advance the public policy of the Patent
and Copyright Clause. Young, supra note 13, at 510. “As a matter of public policy and fairness,
states should not be immune from any suit arising under patent law.” Healey, supra note 9, at 1771.
198. “Intellectual property is the currency of the new global economy.” 145 CONG. REC.
S13552-04, S13558 (1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy). “Intellectual property plays an increasingly
important role in the modern economy.” Wied, supra note 154, at 469.
199.
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world cannot be understated. 200 Patent rights provide the incentive for
individuals and corporations to strive to create new and useful goods for
the benefit of society 201 as a whole. 202 Additionally, the disclosure of the
technology behind the patented invention required by the Patent Act
provides for geometrical growth of the various sciences, as other inventors will feed off of the disclosures made in the issued patent. 203 The
Innovation and creativity have been the fuel of our national economic boom over the
past decade. The United States now leads the world in computing, communications and
biotechnologies . . . . Our national prosperity is, first and foremost, a tribute to American
ingenuity. But it is also a tribute to the wisdom of our Founding Fathers, who made the
promotion of what they called “Science and the Useful Arts” a national project, which
they constitutionally assigned to Congress. And it is no less of a tribute to the successive
Congresses and Administrations of both parties who have striven to provide real incentives and rewards for innovation and creativity by providing strong and even-handed
protection to intellectual property rights.
145 CONG. REC. S13552-04, S13556 (1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy). “[O]ur national economy
depends on real and effective intellectual property rights.” Id.
200. “We are living in a world of increasingly complicated and transient technology, a world
that lends itself to scientific achievements capable of fundamentally altering the human condition.
Intellectual property law, especially patent law, is instrumental to the advancement of this technology.” Craig Allen Nard, Legitimacy and the Useful Arts, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 515, 515-16
(1997).
[I]ntellectual property is more importantly for the development of cultural and civil life
than real property . . . [P]rotection of the expression of ideas, whether they are scientific
inventions, literary works, or commercial trademarks, is the key goal of intellectual
property. Such protection allows for individual and societal flourishing and for the development of means of dissent and expression against state governments.
Shubha Ghosh, Toward a Theory of Regulatory Takings for Intellectual Property: The Path Left
Open After College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 637, 640 (2000).
However, current Eleventh Amendment law “erodes the current value of patents.” Harper, supra
note 92, at 22.
201. “[T]he legal rules vesting property interests in the creators of intellectual properties leads
to the production of works that benefit society.” Beryl R. Jones, Copyrights and State Liability, 76
IOWA L. REV. 701, 732 (1991). The basis for intellectual property laws is “that a community benefits when it encourages its creative and inventive people by honoring the products of their minds.”
Robert W. Sherwood, Human Creativity For Economic Development: Patents Propel Technology,
33 AKRON L. REV. 351, 354 (2000).
202. See Healey, supra note 9, at 1771, 1771 n.243 (stating that “Congress must enforce valid
patent rights as an incentive for inventors to continue to develop technologies”); Randall S. Hersom,
Note, The Constitutionality of the Intellectual Property Remedy Clarification Acts and the Awards
of Relief, 16 J. CORP. L. 521, 525 (1991) (stating that without the exclusive right to control use of
patented inventions, inventors have little incentive to invest in the development of new technologies
or to reveal those technologies to the public). Cf. Jones, supra note 201, at 731-32 (discussing incentives for creation of beneficial works under federal copyright law and the deleterious effect of
not allowing remedies to protect those works from infringement).
203. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (“The specification [in the patent application] shall contain a
written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it. . . .”).
See General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938) (stating underlying
purpose of disclosure requirement is to ensure underlying invention is ultimately dedicated to public).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol35/iss3/5

28

White: Protecting Patent Owners from Infringement by the States
WHITE1.DOC

2002]

1/22/2021 3:45 PM

PROTECTING PATENT OWNERS FROM INFRINGEMENT BY THE STATES

559

continued existence of strong patent rights, including the availability of a
real remedy against the states, is in the public interest. 204
Infringement by the states has not been a serious problem. 205 It
would appear that few, if any, inventors 206 have had their creative energies thwarted by the unavailability of a remedy against state infringers. 207 However, the IPRRA seeks to nip the state infringement problem
in the bud. Providing a solution to a potentially serious problem in its
infancy makes infinitely more sense than seeking to remedy a problem
only after it has become a serious concern. 208
204. “It is the public interest which is dominant in the patent system.” Mercoid Corp. v. MidContinent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1994). See also Young, supra note 13, at 510 (stating the
current situation patent owners find themselves in when states infringe, i.e., either seeking a state to
waive its sovereign immunity or being forced to rely upon a state law ground, does not advance the
public policy set forth in the Patent Clause). “As a matter of public policy and fairness, states
should not be immune from any suit arising under patent law.” Healey, supra note 9, at 1771. Cf.
New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp.2d 1240, 1244 (E.D. Cal. 1999)
(“Without the judicial enforcement provided by the national government, a patent would have little
or no value . . . .”). “[P]atent policy is the province of Congress, not the federal courts.” Cf. Harper,
supra note 92, at 25. State infringement of patent rights might result in short term benefits to the
public, but those benefits would quickly disappear into a long-term detriment. Hersom, supra note
202, at 525-26.
205. A search for cases involving patent infringement by a state or an arm of the state turns up
only a handful of cases. E.g., Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Jacobs Wind
Elec. Co., Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Transp., 919 F.2d 726 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
206. However, this may be because few, if any, inventors would have contemplated that exclusive rights in a patent were not exclusive as to a state. “It would also surprise our citizens to learn
that their exclusive rights to a patent was not exclusive and that governmental units could infringe
upon that right.” Lemelson v. Ampex Corp., 372 F. Supp. 708, 712 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
207.
The issue is not whether State infringement has been frequent in the past, but rather
whether we can assure American inventors and investors and our design trading partners
that, as State involvement in intellectual property becomes ever greater in the new information economy, U.S. intellectual property rights are backed by guaranteed legal
remedies.
145 CONG. REC. S13552-04, S13556 (1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy). “The legal landscape is
surely one of the facts accessed in . . . a cost-benefit analysis and one would expect it to add to the
incentives and disincentives that must be taken into account before a rational actor enters the commercial arena.” Hamrick, supra note 11, at 874. But see Nelson, supra note 4, at 313 (stating that
state sovereign immunity will make “few inventors [willing to] expend the effort and resources to
develop inventions for which they might not be compensated”).
208. When questioned by Rep. Kastenmeier about the timeliness of the PRCA, then Acting
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks Jeffrey M. Samuels had this to say:
There have not been many cases that have raised [the issue of sovereign immunity in the
patent context.] [Providing a remedy against state infringers] is a step that should be
taken not because the possibility exists in light of Atascadero and in light of the Chew
case that more States will get involved in infringing patents. I guess as a general policy
statement, we believe that those engaged – those who do engage in patent infringement
should be subject to all the remedies that are set forth in the Patent Act and that the rights
of a patent owner should not be dependent upon the identity of the entity who is infring-
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Providing a remedy against the states will send a message to America’s innovators and inventors that spending time, money, and energy to
develop new intellectual property is a worthwhile endeavor that will be
rewarded with a patent that no party will be able to infringe. 209
G. IPRRA Discourages State Malfeasance
It is often argued that state accountability for federal intellectual
property rights violations is much ado about nothing. However, as the
number of patents exponentially increases, 210 infringement by the states
is likely to become a more significant problem. 211
One need not cite to authority to support the proposition that states
should not infringe patents owned by private individuals. So simple and
fundamental a proposition can hardly be found elsewhere in the law. By
failing to hold states accountable for patent infringement, 212 states are
implicitly encouraged to infringe patents as they have their only real deterrent, monetary damages, removed. 213
As states have no authority to violate patent laws, 214 they can hardly
ing, whether it be a private individual or corporation, or State.
Patent Remedy Clarification Act: Hearing on H.R. 3886 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., 32 (1990).
209. Otherwise, failure to provide this remedy to private patentees places them at a distinct
disadvantage. Sovereign immunity “when allied with the pressures of a competitive marketplace,
could place the State’s regulated private competitors at a significant disadvantage.” College Sav.
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 695 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
210. See supra note 20.
211. “[S]ome states and some State entities and officials have infringed patents . . . in the past,
and the massive growth of both intellectual property and State participation in intellectual property
that we are seeing as we move into the next century give ample cause for concern that such violation swill continue.” 145 CONG. REC. S13552, S13557 (1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy). Cf. Harper, supra note 92, at 22 (stating that increased pressure on governmental entities to cut costs will
lead to continued if not increased infringement of material protected by federal copyright laws). Cf.
Schoenfeld, supra note 11, at 191 (stating that Eleventh Amendment immunity will encourage states
to infringe copyrighted materials).
212. See Harper, supra note 92, at 22 (“The interaction of exclusive federal court jurisdiction
over copyright infringement suits and state immunity from federal court litigation combined to provide states with a penalty-free opportunity to infringe copyrights.”).
213. Edelman prohibits retroactive monetary judgments against states. “A damage award may
often be the only practical remedy available to the plaintiff, and the threat of a damages award may
be the only effective deterrent to a defendant’s willful violation of federal law.” Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 234, 256-57 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Providing a monetary
damages remedy will deter states from infringing federal intellectual property rights. Harper, supra
note 92, at 22.
214. Lemelson v. Ampex Corp., 372 F. Supp. 708, 711 (N.D. Ill. 1974). One commentator has
referred to a state’s ability to escape liability under the Patent Act as ‘legalized thievery.’ Qazi, su-
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complain that the IPRRA is violative of their rights. A state’s sovereign
immunity does not, and should not, extend to acts outside of the scope of
its legitimate authority. 215
States and their entities are significant participants in the patent and
intellectual property markets. 216 States and the “arms of states” should
be held to a higher standard. At the very least, states should be held to
the same standard as private actors. 217 Governments who are permitted
to commit infringement essentially have a license to commit torts against
private patent owners. 218 This would never be acceptable in any other
context.
H. Sovereign Immunity Policies Do Not Support State Immunity in
Patent Context
The “hodgepodge of confusing and intellectually indefensible
judge-made law” 219 surrounding the Eleventh Amendment is no longer
appropriate, assuming it ever was, in light of the current relationship between federal and state governments. 220 The policy of the Patent Act
pra note 9, at 804.
215. Lemelson argues that an uncompensated infringement of a private party’s patent constitutes an unconstitutional taking and therefore outside of the state’s legitimate authority and as such
sovereign immunity should not exempt the state for infringing a patent. Lemelson v. Ampex Corp.,
372 F. Supp. 708, 711 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
216. Qazi, supra note 9, at 804. Cf. Harper, supra note 92, at 22 (stating that entities having
Eleventh Amendment immunity purchase over $1 billion dollars of copyrighted material).
217. “We can probably all agree that when a State, or a State agency or an officer or employee
of a State acting in an official capacity, infringes a copyright or another federal intellectual property
right, the State should be held accountable for that infringement just as any other person or entity
would be.” Peters Testimony, supra note 19. “Because states reap the benefits of patent laws, these
laws should be applied equally to states, companies, and individuals.” Healey, supra note 9, at
1772-73.
218. Root v. Railway, 105 U.S. 189 (1882), Carbice Corp. of Am. v. American Patents Dev.
Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931). Patent infringement is a tort analogous to trespass. Heath v. A.B. Dick,
253 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1958).
219. Gibbons, supra note 32, at 1891.
220. “The difficulty, however, in adhering to the traditional interpretation of Hans and its
progeny is the lack of substantive arguments supporting state sovereign immunity that remain viable
in the twentieth century.” Weitzman, supra note 15, at 332. Cf. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 694-95 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating a state’s need to invoke sovereign immunity is “unusually weak” where a state is acting in a
commercial and non-governmental role).
If the Court’s Eleventh Amendment doctrine were grounded on principles essential to
the structure of our federal system or necessary to protect the cherished constitutional
liberties of our people, the doctrine might be unobjectionable; the interpretation of the
text of the Constitution in light of changed circumstances and unforeseen events – and
with full regard for the purposes underlying the text – has always been the unique role of
[the Supreme] Court. But the Court’s Eleventh Amendment doctrine diverges from text
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and the exclusive federal jurisdiction for actions arising under the Patent
Act are sound and well established. The Patent Act seeks to promote
science by awarding a successful patent applicant a right to exclude all
others from practicing the patented invention. These strong policies are
not counterbalanced by the policy of the state sovereign immunity. 221
The impetus of the Eleventh Amendment is the prevention of federal court judgments that must be paid out of a state’s treasury. 222 This
justification for sovereign immunity seems insincere. State treasuries
routinely pay monetary damage awards for causes of action under state
or federal law if brought by the federal government. 223 The possibility
of a state being bankrupted by being subject to the same federal laws as
is any other private actor seems quite ridiculous. 224 The Alden Court
was not willing to assume that states are willing to disregard the federal
Constitution or refuse to obey valid federal laws.225 Furthermore, “the
injunctive relief that is permitted can often be more intrusive – and more
expensive – than a simple damages award would be.” 226
Not only does the Eleventh Amendment seek to prevent federal
courts from ordering judgments to be paid to private parties out of state
treasuries, it also serves to avoid the “indignity” of subjecting states to
the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the insistence of private parties. 227 While a state might truly be embarrassed if found liable for patent infringement, this policy concern, if appropriate at all, 228 is substanand history virtually without regard to underlying purposes or genuinely fundamental interests.
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 247-48 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
221. “[T]he widely accepted view among modern nations [is] that when a State engages in ordinary commercial activity sovereign immunity has no significant role to play.” College Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. at 699 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Lane v. First Nat’l Bank, 871 F.2d 166, 173 (1st
Cir. 1989) (recognizing policy of Copyright Act is weightier than policy of state sovereign immunity for actions arising under the Copyright Act)
222. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, (1996); Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp.,
513 U.S. 30 (1994); Huecker v. Milburn, 538 F.2d 1241 (6th Cir. 1976).
223. The Eleventh Amendment presents no barrier to suit by the United States against any
State. United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965). One state may sue another state
without its consent. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 328 (1934).
224. See Schoenfeld, supra note 11, at 191 (stating that enabling individuals to sue states for
copyright infringement “will not place a great burden on the states or their treasuries”). But see
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750 (1999). (“Private suits against nonconsenting States – especially
suits for money damages – may threaten the financial integrity of the States.”).
225. Alden, 527 U.S. at 754-55.
226. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 257 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
227. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Sherwinski v. Peterson, 98 F.3d 849 (5th
Cir. 1996); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887).
228. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 93-95 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Framers did not intend the courts to preserve a state’s dignity, but rather intended
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tially outweighed by the need to provide private patentees with a remedy
against infringing states.
An additional policy is to allow states to control their own public
policy and administration of internal affairs. 229 The essence of this argument is that states would never be able to fulfill their responsibilities
to their citizens if they were continually forced to explain themselves
and their actions in a court of law. 230 As to purely governmental affairs,
this justification may be valid. However, when states engage in commercial activity outside the sphere of pure governmental function, the
ability of the state to provide for its people would not be affected. 231
IV. OTHER REMEDIES
The failure of the IPRRA to pass judicial scrutiny or its inability to
gain the requisite votes to become a law should not sound the death knell
in the attempt to hold infringing states liable for that patent infringement. 232 It might be that state infringement never becomes an issue and
all will be well. However, if the issue makes it to the court system
again, courts should take the opportunity to rethink past precedent. 233
the normal operation of the legislative process and the procedural safeguards included therein to
guard state interests).
229. Blake v. Kline, 612 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1979); Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396, 398 (1987). But see 146 CONG. REC.
S7758 (2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (stating that recent Supreme Court decisions on sovereign
immunity have extended the doctrine “not just to essential organs of State government, but also to a
wide range of State-funded or State-controlled entities and commercial ventures.”)
Under Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), the real policy
concern is striking the proper balance between state sovereignty as reflected in the Eleventh
Amendment and its interpretations with the supremacy of the federal Constitution and laws.
230. Monaghan, supra note 126, at 124.
231. “When a state engages in ordinary commercial ventures, it acts like a private person, outside the area of its ‘core’ responsibilities, and in a way unlikely to prove essential to the fulfillment
of a basic governmental obligation.” College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 694 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
232. See Harper, supra note 92, at 25 (stating that if Congress does not remedy the state infringement problem, patent owners will continue to suffer economic harm).
233. Kurt E. Springmann, The Impact of Seminole on Intellectual Property Infringement By
State Actors: The Interaction of Article I, Article III, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 889, 889 (1997). A starting point in a reanalysis of the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment since Hans v. Louisiana might be the numerous
dissents of Justice Brennan. Justice Brennan has attacked the rule of Hans in most every Eleventh
Amendment case handed down. See, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Pub. Highways & Pub. Transp.,
483 U.S. 468 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Papasan v. Alain, 478 U.S. 265, 293 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 78 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 248 (1985) (Brennan., J., dissenting). Brennan’s dissenting opinions argue that the Article III of the Constitution never intended
to preserve State sovereignty in cases arising under federal law and that the Eleventh Amendment
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The thought of states being able to violate property rights of resident and
non-resident citizens is repugnant to the American system of property.
Sovereign immunity, at least within the context of patent infringement,
is an antiquated and unnecessary doctrine. 234 Of course courts simply
cannot ignore the principles of the Eleventh Amendment; 235 however a
more liberal approach to issues such as waiver or implied consent can
accomplish the necessary ends without violating a state’s sovereign immunity or the text of the Eleventh Amendment. 236 The courts should not
give constitutional status to a nontextual, common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity and then use this status to deny the federal government
the right to exercise powers expressly given to Congress by the states. 237
Another possible solution would be for Congress to remove the
federal judiciary’s exclusive jurisdiction over issues arising under the
Patent Act. However, this solution would likely cause more problems
than it would remedy. 238 But, given that trademark law and unfair comcreates an immunity defense only in the specific situation encountered in the Amendment itself, i.e.,
suits between a State and citizens of another State. Id.; Althouse, supra note 163, at 1127-29. Furthermore, Brennan argues that the surrender of a portion of their sovereignty to Congress in Article
I, sovereignty does not exist with respect to federal laws passed under the authority of Article I.
Stare decisis is perverted when relied upon as a defense for deliberate violations of well-established
federal law. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 98 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
234. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
235. However, allowing Congress to more readily abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity pursuant, particularly in light of the broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause, might render the
Eleventh Amendment a nullity. Weitzman, supra note 15, at 333.
236. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 248 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that it might be time for
the Court to reexamine its Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence in light of the modern federal system).
Taking a more liberal approach would requiring overruling numerous recent Supreme
Court cases. This attack on precedent should not stand in the way of revisiting the Eleventh
Amendment. As Chief Justice Taney said:
I do not, however, object to the revision of [a question he had believed decided by earlier
cases], and am quite willing that it be regarded hereafter as the law of this court, that its
opinion upon the construction of the Constitution is always open to discussion when it is
supposed to have been founded in error, and that its judicial authority should hereafter
depend altogether on the force of the reasoning by which it is supported.
Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
237. Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme
Court’s Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2213, 2238 (1996). See also
Cong. Rec. S7758-01, S7758 (2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (stating that the recent Supreme
Court decisions, particularly, Alden, Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank, were “startling in
their reasoning, casting aside the test of the Constitution, inferring broad immunities from abstract
generalizations about the federalism, and second-guessing Congress’ reasoned judgment about the
need for national remedial legislation.”).
238. For example, inexperienced state court judges would be ill equipped both legally and
technically to handle complex patent infringement actions. See Weitzman, supra note 15, at 334.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created to provide uniformity of the patent
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petition laws coexist between the federal and state systems, 239 double jurisdiction might be a potential remedy. 240
In the end, a Constitutional amendment may be the only way to restore federal intellectual property right protection, but it is unlikely that
states will rush to ratify such an amendment. 241
V. CONCLUSION
The law of sovereign immunity, as it currently stands, constitutes a
serious threat to a significant portion of the patent community. The inability of private patent owners to recover past monetary damages against
a state infringer has the potential to create a serious chilling effect on the
development of new, improved, and beneficial technologies. Furthermore, the inability of an individual or private company to seek a declaratory judgment against a state as a patent owner expands the monopoly of
the Patent Act as to the state in a manner wholly inconsistent with the
underlying purposes of the Act.
The only textual legal authority for sovereign immunity is the Eleventh Amendment. However, this Amendment, in clear and unambiguous
language creates state immunity only in certain, specific circumstances.
A liberal interpretation of the Amendment, as seen in cases from Hans to
Seminole Tribe, creates weaknesses in federal law, particularly law that
is exclusively federal, that are nearly insurmountable.
If the IPRRA becomes law, it will serve to significantly, if not
completely remedy the current sovereign immunity problem with respect
to private patent owners. Not only will the IPRRA provide a remedy, it
will, more importantly, be able to survive judicial scrutiny. The Patent
and Copyright Clause provides a constitutional basis for Congress to enact the IPRRA. Further, the strict abrogation doctrine of recent Supreme
Court cases is completely avoided by requiring states to waive sovereign
immunity or lose the right to obtain patent rights in the future. This
waiver, being a voluntary choice among several options, is clear, unambiguous, and noncoercive, and as such is a valid waiver of sovereign
immunity.
law. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994). Joint state and federal jurisdiction would likely destroy that uniformity. Weitzman, supra note 15, at 334. But, would courts construe a waiver of immunity for
causes of action arising under state law sufficient to subject a state to immunity in a state court for
violation of a federal statute?
239. See Weitzman, supra note 15, at 334.
240. One solution might be to readily allow removal to the federal courts. Another would be to
allow suit in state court only when a State asserts sovereign immunity.
241. 145 CONG. REC. S13552-04, S13556 (1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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